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Abstract. - The most costly and annoying characteristic of the e-mail communication system
is the large number of unsolicited commercial e-mails, known as spams, that are continuously
received. Via the investigation of the statistical properties of the spam delivering intertimes, we
show that spams delivered to a given recipient are time correlated: if the intertime between two
consecutive spams is small (large), then the next spam will most probably arrive after a small
(large) intertime. Spam temporal correlations are reproduced by a numerical model based on the
random superposition of spam sequences, each one described by the Omori law. This and other
experimental findings suggest that statistical approaches may be used to infer how spammers
operate.
Introduction. – Quoting from Ref. [1], a press re-
lease of the European Union: “The proliferation of unso-
licited commercial e-mail, or ‘spam’, has reached a point
where it creates a major problem for the development of
e-commerce and the Information Society. Businesses and
individuals spend an increasing amount of time and money
simply to clean up e-mailboxes. The loss in productivity
for EU businesses has been estimated at 2.5 billion e for
2002. [. . .] Spam has the potential of destroying some of
the major benefits brought about by services such as e-
mail and SMS.”
Spams, defined as undesired commercial e-mails, are es-
timated to be 70 − 80% of all e-mails [2], as everybody
has probably noticed when opening his e-mail box. Such
a large number is explained by considering that the daily
earning of a spammer is proportional to the number of
spams sent. To reduce the nuisance caused by spams, an
enormous effort has been devoted to design efficient spam
filters (see [3] and references therein), able to quickly dis-
criminate between a spam and a legitimate e-mail. Much
less effort has been devoted to the problem of understand-
ing how spammers operate, which is the crucial informa-
tion required to fight spammers at the source. In this
paper, we present a statistical analysis of the spamming
process, which may help unveil how spammers operate.
Dataset. – Our analysis has been made possible by
modern antispam filters, able to discriminate with good
accuracy between legitimate e-mails and spams. These
filters can be configured in such a way that spams are
not erased, but collected in an appropriate folder: we call
this folder the junk folder. We have considered four junk
folders, J1, J2, J3, J4, belonging to four academic e-mail
accounts of our university (domain ‘na.infn.it’). The fold-
ers are created by the antispam filter “Sophos”, and con-
tain respectively 16 · 104, 27 · 103, 21 · 103, and 7 · 103
spams. For comparison, we have also considered one stan-
dard inbox folder, I, containing 4 · 103 legitimate e-mails.
The popularity of the four accounts we have considered
among spammers varies, as the mean intertime between
two consecutive spams is, respectively, 300s, 700s, 1100s
and 870s seconds. For each e-mail, we have determined
the time of arrival and the geographical location of the
sender. The delivering time of an e-mail ti is registered by
the incoming mail server. In order to obtain an estimate
of the error on ti, we set-up a script to send at a regu-
lar interval, tdelay, e-mails from an account Bob (based in
the USA) to a different account, Alice, (based in Italy).
The intertime between two consecutive e-mails delivered
to Alice is not constant and equal to tdelay, but fluctuates.
The typical size of these fluctuations (which may depend
on the internet routing) is 10s. This value is our estimate
for the error on the delivering times. The geographical
location of the sender is determined from the IP address
of the sender [5], which is recorded in the envelop which
complements any e-mail.
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Fig. 1: (color online) Daily dependence of the probability of
receiving an e-mail. I indicates the probability of receiving
a regular e-mail, which is highly structured. Ji indicates the
probability of receiving a spam, which on the contrary exhibits
small oscillations during the day. The index i = 1, 2, 3, 4 iden-
tifies the investigated datasets.
Data analysis. – The investigation of the e-mails re-
ceived by the incoming mail server [4], as shown in Fig. 1,
reveals that spams and legitimate e-mails have different
statistical features. For instance, regular e-mails traffic
has a temporal modulation which clearly reproduces hu-
mans activity (small activity during the night and at lunch
time), whereas spams appear to be insensitive to it. This is
a clear signature of the different mode of operation of the
e-mail senders, “whereas legitimate e-mail transmissions
are driven by social bilateral relationships, spam trans-
missions are a unilateral spammer-driven action” [4].
As shown in Fig. 2, spams are received at constant rate;
yet the time series of the arrival times ti is characterized by
bursts, short temporal periods during which many corre-
lated spams are received. Here we suggest that the origin
of these bursts lies in the use of peer-to-peer (i.e. de-
centralized) network of infected computers to send spams,
known as botnets.
In order to check whether the spamming process could
be considered a stationary Poisson process, we have in-
vestigated the probability distribution P (∆t) of the inter-
times between two consecutive events. For regular e-mails,
where correlations are expected and build up when reply-
ing to previous e-mails [6, 7], the probability distribution
is characterized by a crossover between two power-laws,
as shown in Fig. 3a (inset). For the dataset we have in-
vestigated the corresponding exponents are −0.2 at short
intertimes, and −1.7 at large intertimes, but it has been
suggested that these exponents may depend on the par-
ticular mailbox [8].
Fig 3a shows the spam intertime probability distribu-
tions. We have computed these probability distributions
for each junk folder, as well as for the catalogs obtained
from each junk folder by considering only spams originat-
ing from specific geographical locations, China (CHN),
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Fig. 2: (color online) The cumulated number of delivered e-
mails N(t) increases linearly in time. In order to rescale the
data of different datasets, here we plot N(t)/N , where N is the
number of e-mails of the dataset, as a function of the rescaled
time t = (t − t1)/(tN − t1), where t1 and tN are the time of
arrival of the first and of the last e-mail of the dataset. For
a stochastic process at constant rate N(t) increases linearly
in time. The inset shows how the number of received spams
increases in a temporal window of 3h, and shows the existence
of bursts.
European Union (EU) and United States (USA). These
different distributions are also shown in Fig 3a. Contrary
to the case of regular e-mails, the intertime probability
distributions between spams show universal behaviour if
time is rescaled by the average rate in each dataset. In
fact, P (t) can be expressed as
P (∆t) = 1/τf(∆t/τ), (1)
with f an universal function and τ the mean intertime, as
shown by the data collapse obtained by plotting τP (∆t)
versus ∆t/τ in Fig 3b. The scaling function is well de-
scribed by a generalized gamma distribution,
f(∆t/τ) = α
(
∆t
τ
)β
exp
[
−
(
∆t
τ
)]
, (2)
where α is a normalization constant, and β = −0.25 is
found via a regression procedure. The exponent β can
also be determined from the power spectrum of the in-
tertime distributions, since if P (∆t) ∝ ∆tβ at small ∆t,
then S(ω) ∝ |
∫
P (∆t)e−iω∆td∆t|2 ∝ ω−2(β+1) at large
ω. As β = −0.25 we expect S(ω) ∝ ω−1.5, and Fig. 3(b)
(inset) shows that this is actually the case. As P (∆t) is
not a simple exponential, the spamming process cannot be
considered a homogeneous Poisson process.
We show now that the non-Poissonian nature of the
spamming process is due to the presence of temporal
correlations between spams. We have checked that this
is actually the case first by computing the mean value
〈∆tnext(τ0)〉 of the intertimes following an intertime of
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Fig. 3: (color online) (a) The distribution of intertimes between
two consecutive e-mails of the junk folders is well described
by a Gamma distribution. This is true both for the whole
distribution of intertimes, as well as for the distribution of the
intertimes sent by given geographical locations (the analysis
is restricted to datasets with more than 500 points). Inset:
the distribution of the intertimes between regular e-mails. (b)
Collapse of the intertime distribution of the junk folders. The
dotted line is a fit to Eq. 2, the thick dashed line is the result of
our model. Inset: the power spectrum of P (∆t) for our largest
spam dataset.
size τ0:
〈∆tnext(τ0)〉 =
∑
i∆ti+1δ(∆ti, τ0)∑
i δ(∆ti, τ0)
, (3)
where δ(∆ti, τ0) = 1 if 0.9τ0 < ∆ti < 1.1τ0, 0 otherwise.
In absence of correlations, one expects ∆tnext(τ0)/τ ≃
1. We have determined this quantity both for the origi-
nal time series of the intertimes ∆ti and for the reshuffled
time series. These are obtained from the original time se-
ries by repeatedly exchanging the values of two randomly
chosen intertimes. Fig. 4a (inset) shows that the original
catalog is characterized by a positive correlation between
∆tnext/τ and τ0, which implies that large intertimes are
most probably followed by large intertimes. Conversely,
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Fig. 4: (color online) (a) Conditional probability distribution
P (∆t/τ |τ0), for τ0 ∈ Q1, τ0 ∈ Q4 of the intertimes between
spams of the dataset J1. Inset: mean value of the intertime
∆tnext/τ following an intertime τ0. (b) The same quantities are
shown for the reshuffled catalog, where correlations are absent.
(c) The same quantities are shown for the synthetic catalog,
where correlations are found.
for the reshuffled catalog ∆tnext(τ0)/τ ≃ 1 (see Fig. 4b
(inset)), indicating absence of correlations.
A further check of the existence of correlations is pro-
vided by the study of the conditional probability P (∆t|τ0),
which is the probability of having an intertime ∆t fol-
lowing an intertime ∆t = τ0. To improve the statis-
tics, following [9], we have determined five intertimes
δt∗0 = min∆ti < δt
∗
1 < δt
∗
2 < δt
∗
3 < δt
∗
4 = max∆ti, and
defined four subsets Qk, k = 1, 4, containing respectively
the intertimes enclosed between δt∗k−1 and δt
∗
k. The inter-
times δt∗k, k = 1, 2, 3 are chosen in such a way that the
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four subsets contain the same number of elements. We
have then computed Pi(∆t/τ |τ0), τ0 ∈ Qi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
For instance, P1 is the probability distribution of the in-
tertimes (normalized by the mean intertime) following the
smallest intertimes, whereas P4 is the probability distri-
bution of the intertimes following the largest intertimes.
In absence of correlations these conditional probabilities
should all coincide, being equal to the unconditional prob-
ability distribution. We show in Fig. 4a P1 and P4: it is
apparent the presence of a systematic difference between
the two curves, particularly at large intertimes, where
P4(∆t|τ0) > P1(∆t/τ |τ0). P1 and P4 are also described
by Eq. 1, but the exponents which characterize their power
law behavior at short intertimes are different, being equal
to β = −0.35 and β = −0.20, respectively. Conversely, for
the reshuffled catalog, P1 and P4 do coincide, as shown
in Fig. 4b. From this analysis, we can positively conclude
that there exist temporal correlations between spams.
Theoretical model. – These results are very simi-
lar to those found in the study of earthquakes [10], where
one investigates the statistical features of catalogs regis-
tering the time of occurrence of each earthquake, as well
as its magnitude. Similar results have been also found
in financial markets [11] and climate [12]. The study
of earthquakes catalogs has shown that the distribution
of intertimes between earthquakes is described by the
same functional form we found for the intertimes between
spams [10]. Indeed for worldwide seismicity, where the
occurrence rate is constant, Corral [10] found a Gamma
function with a power law initial regime with an exponent
β ≃ −0.3, close to our value. Also the study of the condi-
tional probability distributions [9] gives similar results. A
deeper understanding of seismic catalogs is however made
possible by the fact that earthquakes are characterized by
a magnitude, a quantity which has not a counterpart in
the case of spams. Correlating the magnitude of an earth-
quake with its occurrence time, it makes possible to clarify
that seismic catalogs can be considered as the random su-
perposition of sequences correlated events. Namely, if the
first event of the sequence (the mainshock) occurs at time
t = 0, then the probability that subsequent events (after-
shocks) occur at time t is P (t) ∝ t−p, where p ≃ 1 (Omori
law). The sequences are identified considering that the
mainshock usually has magnitude greater than subsequent
quakes, and actually triggers them.
These considerations suggest that the spam timeseries
could also be considered as the random superposition of
power law correlated bursts. It is difficult to directly val-
idate this possibility, as the absence of a variable which
plays the role of the magnitude makes difficult the identi-
fication of the starting event in the burst, even though in
some cases bursts are clearly observable in the timeseries,
as in Fig. 2 (inset). To verify this possibility, we have con-
structed a synthetic catalog composed by a superposition
of Ns = 10
5 sequences of nb events The first element of a
sequence occurs at time t0, followed by the others occur-
ring at time t > t0 with probability P (t− t0) ∝ (t− t0)
−p,
truncated at t = t0+10t
∗, with t∗ conventionally set equal
to 1. For each sequence, the starting time t0 is randomly
chosen in the interval [0 : t∗Ns], and therefore the mean
intertime between the beginning of two consecutive se-
quences is t∗. We have then determined p and nb fitting
the intertime distribution from the model to a Gamma
distribution with power low exponent −0.25. The best
fit, which is shown in Fig. 3(b), is obtained with p = 0.8
and nb = 10. Interestingly, the value of the exponent
p is close to the measured value of the Omori exponent
for earthquakes. The model exhibits a constant rate, and
does also reproduce the intertimes distribution, as shown
in Fig. 3(b), as well as the spam correlations, as shown in
Fig. 4c. These results suggest that, as earthquakes, cli-
mate and financial markets, also spams occur in bursts of
evenets correlated according to the Omori law.
Conclusions. – It remains open the understanding of
the origin of the spam bursts. A step in this direction is
given by the analysis of the IP addresses of the computers
from which spams are sent. This shows that 1) it never
happens that a recipient receives two spams sent by the
same IP in a time-window of few hours, and that 2) it
occurs that the same spam is sent by the same IP to two
different recipients. These evidences, together with the ob-
servation that a spammer does not send all of his messages
from a single IP, both because it would be too easily dis-
covered, and because it would require too much time due
to bandwidth limitations, strongly supports the idea that
spammers operate via the use of networks of infected com-
puters, known as botnets [13]. The computational task
of sending the e-mails, as well as the bandwidth require-
ments, is therefore divided among the infected comput-
ers. At the present time, there is little information about
the structure of botnets, as previous studies have inves-
tigated the strategies used to infect a computers, as well
as the protocols used by infected computers to communi-
cate. Nevertheless, our result suggests that botnets are
highly dynamical networks, new infected computers being
continuously added to replace those that disappear, either
because they are switched off, or because their infection is
removed via the use of antivirus tools. Botnets may also
explain the origin of correlations between spams. Indeed,
it seems possible that each burst represents the activity
of a single spammer. The spammer sends simultaneously
more messages to the same user, who receives them at dif-
ferent arrival times, the arrival time of each spam depend-
ing on the path followed on the net. As a consequence,
the intertimes distribution and the intertimes correlations
may result from the topology of the botnet.
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